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In this paper short reviews and some numerical results are given for the recent research 
developments in stock, foreign exchange and commodity markets from the physicist's point 
of view where the new branch of physics "econophysics" has been established. 1) These 
new fields are attractive for physicists mainly because many detailed data are available and 
the problems seem suitable for statistical methods. 
Empirical findings for stock and foreign exchange markets2) are 
(i) that the distributions of logarithmic price changes show power law tails with 
an exponent a= 3, so called fat tails, 
(ii) that the price changes are correlated only over rather short time scales of 
typically r = 4 minutes, and 
(iii) that the amplitude of the price changes, volatility has long-range correlation 
which vanishes as a power law with an exponent of y = 1/3. 
Similar results have been reported recently for the commodity markets as well,3) 
(i) an exponent a = 3, 
(ii) short time scales of typically r = 3 days or more, and 
(iii) an exponent y = 0.54. 
A new theory is required to explain these discoveries which go beyond the efficient 
market hypothesis4), 5) for the following reasons. First, these results disagree with beliefs 
that the price changes for stock and foreign exchange markets obey the geometrical 
Brownian motion, exhibiting the Gaussian tail for its distribution. It should decay 
exponentially fast for the Gaussian tail. Second, they indicate the universal nature where 
1) See for example http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/ in the Internet for the latest development. 
2) R. N. Mantegna and H. E. Stanley, "An Introduction to Econophysics Correlations and Complexity in 
finance", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000. 
3) Kaushik Matia, Luis A. Nunes Amaral, Stephen P. Goodwin and H. Eugene Stanley, "Non-Levy 
Distribution of Commodity Price Fluctuations"(2002), preprint cond-matl0202028. 
4) P. A. Samuelson, "Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly", Industrial Management 
Rev. 6(1965)41. 
5) E. F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: II", J. Finance 46(1991)1575. 
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quite different markets obey the similar regularities. Finally, the value of the exponents a = 
3 excludes the application of Levy stable distribution which was earlier proposed for 
commodity markets and others. 
There have been many approaches to understand the price changes in finance. Among 
them there are empirical methods which practitioners of financial institutions use such as 
ARCH models,6) Black-Scholes formula,?)' 8) etc., some of them as early as the efficient 
market hypothesis was proposed in 1960s. The Black-Scholes formula (1973) relies on the 
Brownian random process for price changes. Although the distribution of the price changes 
can be well approximated near the peak by the Gaussian, it can not lead to the fat tail and 
this is reflected on the appearance of "smile" which should not be there in reality. ARCH-
type models which are ad hoc time-series models and reproduce the fat tails can not satisfy 
the findings either. They do not have asymptotic power-law decay in the volatility 
correlation function. The models were introduced to explain clustered volatility where the 
volatility varies with time. 
In recent years a novel effort to solve the problems has appeared, characterized by 
agents which imitate behaviors of human agents involved in financial markets. 2), 9) The 
agents-based model lO) seeks to take into account intelligence, learning, complex decision 
making in addition to emotion, irrationality and intuition. Studies in this direction range 
from simple models like evolutionary game theory II) to complicated simulations like the 
Santa Fe Institute stock market model (SFI model). 12) The SFI model has shown that many 
of the dynamical properties of real markets such as fat tails and clustered volatility are 
reproduced automatically when the model allows the participants of the markets to make 
decisions dynamically. Although successful, it also brought many unanswered questions 
due to its complexity of simulations. 
6) R. F. Engle, "Fourier Analysis of Distributions Functions. A Mathematical Study of the Laplace-
Gaussian Law", Acta Math. 77(1945)1. 
7) F. Black and M.Scholes, "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities", J. Polit. Econ. 81(1973)637. 
8) R. C. Merton, "Theory of Rational Option Pricing", Bell J. Econ. Management Sci. 4(1973)141. 
9) J. Doyne Farmer, "Physicists attempt to scale the ivory towers of finance", Computing Sci. & Eng., 
November-December 1999, 26-39. 
10)B. LeBaron, "Agent-Based Computational Finance: Suggested Readings and Early Research", J. 
Economic Dynamics and Control 24(2000)679. 
11)J. W. Weibull, "Evolutionary Game Theory", MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996. 
12)8. LeBaron, W. B. Arthur and R. Palmer, "Time Series Properties of an Artificial Stock Market", J. 
Economic Dynamics and Control 23(1999)1487. 
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The minority game (MG)13) offers another approach in terms of simulations. The model 
is simple, but displays rich behaviors. It is a simplified version of the agents-model, the EI 
Farol's bar attendance problem (BP).14) 
The question of the EI Farol problem is whether one should go to the bar of limited seats 
of 100. If the bar is overcrowded with guests more than 60, one can not enjoy attending the 
bar. To be able to go there one has to guess when other people do not, based on the past 
attendance as a public information. The situation is a typical case of people sorting after the 
limited resource. All what one knows is the past attendance as history. The process of 
decision making looks similar to heterogeneous agents trying to make the best decision 
with bounded rationality. 
In MG a fixed (odd) number N of agents are given two alternatives, sell or buy for the 
case of market, route A or route B when deciding over not too crowded route, etc. Which 
alternatives agents choose, the winners are those who make the same decisions as minority, 
hence the name minority game. Only information known to the agents is the last M bits of 
winner's outcome when "0" and "I" is assigned for the alternatives. The length M indicates 
pre-assigned memory length, called history. The agents have certain number S of strategies 
to cope with the competition. Every time step each strategy is given a virtual point when it 
predicts the minority group correctly. Agents use the strategies inductively to play with the 
best strategy out of S. It involves only three parameters, the number of agents N, the length 
of memory M and the number of strategies S, yet showing rich structures. The model has 
been extensively studied numerically as well as analytically. 
The main results are summarized as follows. I), 13) It shows a self-organized collective 
behavior signaled by the phase transition between a symmetric phase and an asymmetric 
phase when NS-No(=2M+1). The phase transition can be understood in terms of herd effect. 
Note that the number of possible histories is 2M and the number of strategies is 2A2M. Each 
strategy can be placed on a Boolean hypercube in the 2M dimensional strategy space. The 
similarity between any pair of strategies can be measured by the Hamming distance dM 
which counts the number of different digits in each order between two binary digits of 
13)D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang, "Emergence of Cooperation and Organization in an Evolutionary Game", 
Physica A 246(1997)407, Y.-C. Zhang, "Modeling Market Mechanism with Evolutionary Games", 
Europhys. News 29(1998)51, Robert Savit, Radu Manuca and Rick Riolo, "Adaptive Competition, 
Market Efficiency, Phase Transition", Phys. Rev. Lett. 82(1999)2203, M. A. R. de Cara O. Pia and F. 
Guinea, "Competition, efficiency and collective behavior in the 'EI Farol' bar problem" Eur. Phys. J. B 
10(1999)187. 
14)Brian W. Arthur, "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality (The EI Farol Problem)", Am. Econ. 
Assoc. Papers and Proc 84(1994)406. 
same length. The maximal Hamming distance is 2M which is visualized as completely 
opposite points on the hypercube, so called anti-correlated pair with the number of 
strategies No. One agent of the anti-correlated pair predicts always the opposite of the other. 
All the other Hamming distances for this No are 2M -I and they are mutually independent 
because the Hamming distance is half of the maximal distance. Vast majority of strategies 
which do not belong to No are positively correlated. We can predict that there should be 
three distinctive situations according to the relative magnitude of NS and No. If NS» No 
(crowded case), the players have to use strategies which are positively correlated, 
necessitating the herd effect (crowd effect) to weaken the adaptability of the players. 
Resources would be wasted in this case. If, on the other hand, NS« No, the players can 
choose independent strategies, random strategies. Finally, for the intermediate case NS-No, 
the agents can exploit anti-correlated strategies to coordinate mutual avoidance although 
they use mostly independent strategies. This is the most efficient case. 
The model has been extensively studied in various methods. I) Initial results have been 
obtained by simulations. i3) Later, it was exactly solved in analogy to the spin-glass in a 
stationary state. IS) The dynamical aspects of MG have been clarified by the functional 
method. 16) 
The model has been extended in several directions. I) The crowd-anticrowd theory 17) was 
proposed based on a reduced set of strategies related to No. It is useful to treat MG 
intuitively. The model was enlarged to describe the real markets i8) involving capital, 
producers, speculators, noise traders, etc. Thermal effects have been considered. 19) To 
improve the memory update a neural network was inc1uded.20) Mixed population of various 
15)D. Challet, M. Marsili and R. Zecchina, "Statistical Mechanics of Heterogeneous Agents", Phys. Rev. 
Lett. 84(2000) 1824. 
16)J. A. F. Heimel and A. C. C. Coolen, "Generating Functional Analysis of the Dynamics of the Batch 
Minority Game with Random External Information", Phys. Rev. E 65(2002)016126. 
17)Neil F. Johnson, Michael Hart and Pak Ming Hui, "Crowds Effects and Volatility in Markets with 
Competing Agents", Physica A 269(1999)1, M. Hart, P. Jefferies, N. F. Johnson and P. M. Hui, 
"Crowd-Anticrowd model of the Minority Game"(2000), preprint cond-matl0003486. 
18)F. Slanina and Y.-C. Zhang, "Capital Flow in a Two Component Dynamical System", Physica A 
272(1999)257, D. Challet, M. Marsili and Y.-C. Zhang, "Modeling Market Mechanism with Minority 
Game", Physica A 276(2000)284, Neil F. Johnson, Michael Hart, Pak Ming Hui and Dafang Zheng, 
"Trader Dynamics in a Model Market", Work presented at the EPS Dublin finance conference (July 
1999). 
19)A. Cavagna, J.P. Garrahan, I. Giardina and D. Sherrington, "A Thermal Model for Adaptive 
Competition in a Market", Phys. Rev. Lett. 83(1999)4429. 
20)W. Kinzel, R. Metzler and I. Kanter, "Dynamics of Interacting Neural Networks", J. Phys. A 
33(2000)L 141, Joseph Wakeling and Per Bak, "Intelligent systems in the context of surrounding 
environment", Phys. Rev. E 64(2001 )051920. 
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memories have been treated. 21 ) It was pointed out that the anti-persistence offers an 
advantage for agents with longer memory, based on anti-persistent time series on a De 
Bruijn Graph.22) 
Finally, I discuss the MG-like model recently proposed where an evolutionary effect on 
strategies is taken into account.23), 24) The strategies of agents are probabilities Pi, the gene 
values to follow a predicted outcome after some history. The agent i contradicts the outcome 
with the probability I-Pi' The history of length M and predicted outcome, 0 or 1 are known 
to all agents as a public information. Similar to the standard MG the minority wins. Each 
agent gets plus one point (prize) for a winning turn and minus one point (fine) for a losing 
tum. The probability Pi is updated every time the scores go below a critical value d. 
In the present paper I chose a prize point g=0.97l and the fine point fixed as minus one, 
hence g being equal to the prize-to-fine ratio,24) and found two other types of gene 
distribution P(p) for varying d, two peaks for d=-lO and one valley for d=-l 00 in addition 
to one peak recently discovered for d=_4.24) In the simulations 10001 agents have been 
assumed for the average gene value <p> and the gene distribution P(p), and 100001 agents 
for PDF fez) as a function of the change of room occupancy reduced by the standard 
deviation, z. In all cases 100000 time steps have been taken. The graph for the average 
gene value indicates that the state is in equilibrium at d=-lOO while oscillating at d=-4. 
These results imply a phase transition as a function of d. We can interpret this as a revival 
phenomenon to the self-segregation23) which was induced by decreasing d to overcome an 
unstable situation. If the tolerance level is sufficiently low, we can take a risk in order to 
win by the extreme behavior recognized earlier.23) The room occupancy change shows 
much wider fluctuation for d=-4 than for d=-100, which is confirmed by PDF. Both PDFs 
show Gaussian in the central regions, and decay slightly slower than the Gaussian for d=-4 
while for d=-100 the curve appears to be taken over by another Gaussian. Although the 
model exhibits the self-organizing tendency, it does not show the power behavior clearly. 
Received:February 15, 2002 
21)N.F. Johnson, P.M. Hui, D. Zheng and M. Hart, "Enhanced winnings in a mixed-ability population 
playing a minority game", J. Physics A: Mathematics and General 32(1999)L427, M. Paczuski and K. 
E. Bassler, "Self-organized Networks of Competing Boolean Agents"(1999), preprint cond-
matl9905082. 
22)R. Metzler, "Anti persistent Binary Time Series"(2001), preprint cond-matl01 09243. 
23) Neil F. Johnson, Pak Ming Hui, Rob Jonson and Ting Shek Lo, "Self Organized Segregation within an 
Evolving Population", Phys. Rev. Lett. 82(1999)3360, T. S. Lo, P. M. Hui and N. F. Johnson, "Theory 
of Evolutionary Minority Game", Phys. Rev. E 62(2000)4393. 
24)S. Hod and E. Nakar, "Segregation vs. Clustering in the Evolutionary Minority Game"(2002), preprint 
cond-matl0201002. 
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